This research paper analyses the political and strategic considerations that prevent the US government from taking over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal despite its misgivings about Islamabad’s policies and the real risk that those atomic weapons may at some point come under the control of terrorists.
The American National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is likely to remain inapplicable to Pakistan’s “Islamic bombs” in view of the country’s sheer size and military capabilities and the support it musters from other Muslim states and China.
The best option instead is to persuade the government in Islamabad to sign the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and adopt a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence.
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World Affairs is a leading journal, printed and published in India. It seeks to provide the much needed Asian and the developing world’s perspective on issues of global significance. It stimulates interaction and debate between developed and scholars and decision makers in all countries.
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World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues © 2013 Kapur Surya Foundation
